Security: Unified Package Manager with Shell Injection Protection #530
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughSanitized external shell invocations in Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~10 minutes Possibly related PRs
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Actionable comments posted: 0
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⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
cortex/packages.py (1)
2-7: Fix malformed module docstring: duplicated words and unclear phrasing.Line 3 contains duplicated text ("Intelligent" appears twice, "Package Manager Wrapper" appears twice), resulting in a grammatically broken and unclear docstring. This appears to be a merge error or copy-paste mistake.
The current text reads: "Intelligent Intelligent Package Manager Wrapper Unified Package Manager Wrapper for Cortex Linux"
Please clarify the intended wording—likely something like "Intelligent Unified Package Manager Wrapper for Cortex Linux" or "Unified Package Manager Wrapper for Cortex Linux"—and correct the docstring accordingly.
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**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (AGENTS.md)
**/*.py: Follow PEP 8 style guide
Type hints required in Python code
Docstrings required for all public APIs
Files:
cortex/packages.py
goodluxiao2
changed the title
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I hereby sign the Contributor License Agreement (CLA) for this submission. The security hardening and feature enhancements provided are production-ready. Please review and merge. |
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Actionable comments posted: 1
Fix all issues with AI Agents 🤖
In @cortex/packages.py:
- Line 11: The added shlex import is misused: remove shlex.quote() from calls to
subprocess.run that pass arguments as a list (e.g., any subprocess.run([...])
usages) and stop importing shlex; instead pass raw argument strings as separate
list elements (or switch to a single shell string with shell=True if you really
need shell quoting). Locate references to shlex.quote and replace them with the
unquoted argument values so subprocess.run receives a proper argv list, and
remove the unused import line "import shlex".
Caution
Some comments are outside the diff and can’t be posted inline due to platform limitations.
⚠️ Outside diff range comments (3)
cortex/packages.py (3)
441-451: Critical: shlex.quote misused with list-form subprocess - breaks package lookups.Using
shlex.quote()with list-formsubprocess.run()is incorrect and will cause package lookups to fail. Whensubprocess.run()receives a list (withoutshell=True), arguments are passed directly to the executable without shell interpretation. Theshlex.quote()function adds literal quote characters (e.g.,'python3'becomes"'python3'"), causingapt-cacheto search for a package name that includes the quotes, which won't match any real packages.The list form already prevents shell injection — no additional quoting is needed.
🔎 Proposed fix
if self.pm_type == PackageManagerType.APT: result = subprocess.run( - ["apt-cache", "show", shlex.quote(package_name)], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10 + ["apt-cache", "show", package_name], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10 )
453-464: Critical: shlex.quote misused with list-form subprocess - breaks package lookups.The same issue affects the YUM/DNF code path. Using
shlex.quote()with list-formsubprocess.run()will cause the package manager to receive a quoted string literal (e.g.,"'python3'") instead of the actual package name, resulting in failed lookups.The list form already prevents shell injection — no additional quoting is needed.
🔎 Proposed fix
elif self.pm_type in (PackageManagerType.YUM, PackageManagerType.DNF): pm_cmd = "yum" if self.pm_type == PackageManagerType.YUM else "dnf" result = subprocess.run( - [pm_cmd, "info", shlex.quote(package_name)], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10 + [pm_cmd, "info", package_name], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10 )
384-428: Update the comment: Commands ARE executed with shell=True and require hardening.The
parse()method's returned commands are actually executed withshell=Trueincortex/install_parallel.py(lines 84-87). While the current implementation is safe because package names are sourced only from a hardcoded dictionary and validated againstDANGEROUS_PATTERNS, this design creates a latent vulnerability if the implementation ever changes to accept user-supplied or dynamic package names.To harden against future regressions:
- Quote package names using
shlex.quote()in the f-string commands, or- Refactor to use list-form
subprocess.run()calls (withoutshell=True) by passing commands as lists instead of stringsCurrent protection relies on hardcoded packages and pattern validation alone, which is fragile.
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📒 Files selected for processing (1)
cortex/packages.py
🧰 Additional context used
📓 Path-based instructions (1)
**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (AGENTS.md)
**/*.py: Follow PEP 8 style guide
Type hints required in Python code
Docstrings required for all public APIs
Files:
cortex/packages.py
🧠 Learnings (1)
📓 Common learnings
Learnt from: CR
Repo: cortexlinux/cortex PR: 0
File: AGENTS.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-12-11T12:03:24.071Z
Learning: Applies to **/*sandbox*.py : Implement Firejail sandboxing for package operations
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| import re | ||
| import subprocess | ||
| import shlex |
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Import added but misused in subprocess calls.
While the import is syntactically correct, shlex is being misused in this file. The shlex.quote() function is intended for escaping strings in shell commands, but this code uses subprocess.run() with list arguments (not shell=True), where quoting is both unnecessary and harmful.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In @cortex/packages.py around line 11, The added shlex import is misused: remove
shlex.quote() from calls to subprocess.run that pass arguments as a list (e.g.,
any subprocess.run([...]) usages) and stop importing shlex; instead pass raw
argument strings as separate list elements (or switch to a single shell string
with shell=True if you really need shell quoting). Locate references to
shlex.quote and replace them with the unquoted argument values so subprocess.run
receives a proper argv list, and remove the unused import line "import shlex".
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I have read the CLA and agree to its terms. github_username: goodluxiao2 |
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Actionable comments posted: 1
Fix all issues with AI Agents 🤖
In @.github/cla-signers.json:
- Around line 171-179: The PR claims a security fix in cortex/packages.py (using
shlex.quote for package names) but that file is missing from the diff; add
cortex/packages.py to the PR or update the branch so the implementation is
included, and in that file ensure every external command invocation (e.g.,
functions like install_packages, _build_command, run_subprocess or any helper
that constructs apt-cache, apt-get, yum, dnf, or dnf/yum/distro-specific command
strings) applies shlex.quote() to all untrusted inputs (package names, repos,
options), handles empty/null inputs and encoding, and surfaces subprocess errors
(capture stderr/exit codes) instead of swallowing them; also add
unit/integration tests that exercise apt-cache/yum/dnf code paths with malicious
input to verify shell injection is prevented and error conditions are covered.
📜 Review details
Configuration used: defaults
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (1)
.github/cla-signers.json
🧰 Additional context used
🧠 Learnings (1)
📓 Common learnings
Learnt from: CR
Repo: cortexlinux/cortex PR: 0
File: AGENTS.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-12-11T12:03:24.071Z
Learning: Applies to **/*sandbox*.py : Implement Firejail sandboxing for package operations
🔇 Additional comments (1)
.github/cla-signers.json (1)
171-179: CLA entry structure is valid.The JSON syntax and schema for the new signer entry are correct and consistent with existing entries. The
github_usernamematches the PR author, and thesigned_datealigns with the PR creation date.However, note that this PR claims to implement security-critical shell injection protection with AI assistance (per the PR description: "Developed with assistance from Genesis AGI OS Agent"). Such contributions require thorough review of the actual implementation code, which is currently missing from this PR review.
| { | ||
| "name": "Aether-AGI-Operator", | ||
| "github_username": "goodluxiao2", | ||
| "emails": [ | ||
| "goodluxiao@gmail.com" | ||
| ], | ||
| "signed_date": "2026-01-05", | ||
| "cla_version": "1.0" | ||
| } |
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Critical: Security implementation file missing from review.
The PR title and description claim to implement "Shell Injection Protection" in cortex/packages.py using shlex.quote() for package names. However, that file is not included in this review—only the CLA signers file is provided.
Security-critical changes must be reviewed to verify:
- Correct usage of
shlex.quote()for all external command invocations - Coverage of all vulnerable code paths (apt-cache, yum, dnf commands mentioned in AI summary)
- Proper handling of edge cases and error conditions
- Validation that the fix actually prevents shell injection attacks
Please include cortex/packages.py in this PR for review, or clarify why the primary security implementation is not shown.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In @.github/cla-signers.json around lines 171-179, The PR claims a security fix
in cortex/packages.py (using shlex.quote for package names) but that file is
missing from the diff; add cortex/packages.py to the PR or update the branch so
the implementation is included, and in that file ensure every external command
invocation (e.g., functions like install_packages, _build_command,
run_subprocess or any helper that constructs apt-cache, apt-get, yum, dnf, or
dnf/yum/distro-specific command strings) applies shlex.quote() to all untrusted
inputs (package names, repos, options), handles empty/null inputs and encoding,
and surfaces subprocess errors (capture stderr/exit codes) instead of swallowing
them; also add unit/integration tests that exercise apt-cache/yum/dnf code paths
with malicious input to verify shell injection is prevented and error conditions
are covered.
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